Abstract. This article examines the interaction of organisational and technological changes adopted by parties to respond to 7 members' demands for more participation. We develop a term, platform politics, and create a framework for identifying how 8 parties use platforms to open or close intra-party decision-making. The framework is then applied to two institutionalised parties 9 (PSOE and PD) and to two movement-based parties (Podemos and M5S) of the changing party systems of Spain and Italy. We 10 conclude that the tensions between existing organisational structures and the use of internet-based platforms create a series of 11 unintended consequences for parties, which result in potentially disruptive outcomes. 
Introduction

14
Western European party systems have recently had to deal with the consequences of latent political Parties are political actors with primary goals (Harmel & Janda, 1994) and organisational characteris-29 tics, which behave strategically to win elections and influence policies. To this aim, they can use online 30 platforms, yet this use can put a strain on those parties' organisations. While many political parties seem
31
to have adopted at least some online tools, the implications of the relationship between party organisa-32 tions and the type of online platforms they have adopted are still unclear. In this article, we are interested 33 in understanding the role played by technology in the organisational transformation of political parties 34 at different levels of institutionalisation, and more specifically, the consequences of the use of online 35 platforms by two institutionalised parties and two movement-parties from Southern Europe.
36
To this end, we develop a term, platform politics, and use it to describe how parties use online plat-
37
forms to facilitate members' participation. Our analysis builds on previous research that examines how 38 the design of online platforms reflects political values like decentralization of political power (Deseriis, 39 2017). We develop an analytical framework for studying the relationship of parties' organisational fea-
40
tures and online platforms, stemming from a broader discussion of the crisis of representation, parties'
41 new approaches to rank-and-file engagement, and technological solutionism (Morozov, 2013) .
42
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly examine the literature to explore the organisa- Fourth, we explain the methodology of our research, rooted in a document analysis we have conducted 55 to give meaning to parties' use of online platforms.
56
Fifth, we examine two institutionalised parties of the centre-left (PSOE and PD) and two movement-57 parties (Podemos and M5S) from Spain and Italy, to illustrate how platform politics plays out in different 58 organisational conditions. Importantly, we argue that a series of unintended consequences for political 59 parties appear as they adopt new forms of organisation and communication, leading to challenges that 60 need to be addressed in order not to damage consensus. In particular, movement-parties tend to fall into 61 a series of contradictions as they institutionalise, while the crisis of institutionalised parties has certainly 62 not been solved through an inconsistent online presence.
63
Last, we conclude our study with a series of questions aimed at outlining a research agenda that will 64 be able to further evaluate the consequences stemming from our analytical framework and its empirical 65 application.
66
2. The transformation of modern political parties
67
During the past five decades, political parties have gone through a slow crisis, testified by the weak-
68
ening of traditional partisan attachments, the fall of party membership, and an increased volatility of the 69 electorate. Given how established mass parties adopt catch-all strategies (Kirchheimer, 1966) in an effort to reimagine interactions with their members and address the crisis of representation.
159
Figuratively, a platform is the foundation of an action or event forming the basis for further achieve-160 ment (OED, 2017), and therefore in computer science, it has come to indicate an infrastructure that 161 supports the design and use of applications, including hardware, operating systems, and mobile devices.
162
Coupled with the architectural definition of a platform as a raised, horizontal surface, we see a platform 163 as a "place or opportunity for public discussion" (MWD, 2017 
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In contrast, closed platform politics grants intellectual property rights to private individuals who then 
205
Note that, to a certain extent, the owners of a platform always limit participation, so that openness 206 largely depends on the platform design, i.e. the rules governing how users interact with the platform.
207
User experience is also inscribed within the technology of the platform, rooted in the technical expertise Platform politics are appealing to movement-parties when they allow 'the people' to participate in 221 shared decision-making, therefore they should privilege a platform that is tailored for rank-and-file mem-222 bers of the party. While not directly addressing populism in our work, we acknowledge that this language 223 can fit within the thin ideology of the 'good people' against the 'corrupt elites' that populism proposes.
224
In general, new, decentralized, internet-mediate parties offer an optimistic view of participation; instead When thinking about open platform politics, we naturally tend to associate them with a federative or- as party leaders have freedom over platform implementation.
237
The following figure shows the two aspects on the two axes of a graph, and includes the ideal posi-238 tioning of an old, institutionalised mass party, and of a movement-based party at two opposite corners. internet-based elements find themselves projected into a structure that they do not fit in? How has the and apps (4).
261
When conducting our analysis, we paid attention to the subjectivity of the source of the document elements.
269
We expect future research to expand on our investigation by (i) studying the association between par- On the other side, PD and PSOE are known to the electorate as stable, institutionalized party machines, (Garzón, 2015) . In addition, it is worthy to remember Podemos' platform has come across problems 344 with the census of registered members. It seems that massive processes of online affiliation usually put 345 to the test digital platforms when they start to function. Last, the structure that was ultimately adopted at 346 the first Citizens' Assembly was rather conventional, all of which makes Podemos' organization on the 347 ground closer to a stratarchy than to a federation.
348
Such criticisms reveal the organisational challenge of platform politics for movement parties: incor-
349
porating the rhetoric and the tools is easy, but relinquishing control over candidate selection and policy to the party, and join local party affiliates. PSOE has experienced significant challenges in using its 375 platform to consult rank-and-file members and share authority in party governance.
376
In the aftermath of the Spanish parliamentary elections of 2015, PSOE's leader Pedro Sánchez, used 377 the party's online platform to put to a vote a possible coalition agreement with the centre-right party
378
Ciudadanos. Members of the party were given 8 days to register on the miPSOE website (PSOE Con-379 sulta, 2016), and then they could vote online over two days, or in person at polling locations. despite the relative degree of freedom of the local party, the leadership always has the last word, as all 428 members are exposed to non-arguable sanctions from above. on M5S' blog, and almost nobody voting against the proposals, making them basically online plebiscites.
436
In only a few months participation fell under 20,000 members. In the leadership election of September 
451
The lack of a national congress has also made it hard to coordinate the party line, and M5S's new axis) and the type of platform politics (y-axis) that they have followed. Going forward, a spatial analysis 533 might be the best way to assess the difference between different formations, through the elaboration of 534 appropriate metrics.
535
To understand how techno-political changes are affecting party dynamics, we need to consider how 536 parties adapt organisationally to demands for more citizen participation. We argue that embracing online or to make participation more inclusive and meaningful for rank-and-file party members.
542
We suggest that platform politics have been particularly attractive for movement-parties, that imple- forays into platform politics, resulting in limited participation.
559
Moving forward, we propose several questions that are relevant to future studies of platform poli- of a party's platform users, and see whether they constitute a cohesive constituency that can be targeted 564 through different kinds of involvement techniques.
565
We would also like to know, since parties adopt platform politics to appeal to voters, are these efforts to 566 expand online participation rewarded with electoral success? Do parties perform better at the polls when 567 they rely on platforms to decide candidate lists and coordinate mobilization strategies? The evidence 568 offered by this paper shows that this might be the case, but it refers to a small sample of cases over a platform politics can provide insights about how voters evaluate promises of internal party democracy.
571
The relationship of a party's ideology to its use of platforms also warrants further study. Parties like
572
M5S offer the scaffolding of a lean party program, but claim to represent citizens on the left and the right.
573
Does a vague ideological commitment determine electoral success or does ideology get in the way once 574 the online organization reaches a certain size? Further, can a form of partisan platform politics be adopted 575 successfully on the fringes of the political spectrum? These questions will probably be best answered 576 once the adoption of platform politics becomes more widespread across European party systems, but it 577 would be important to offer an assessment based on the current situation.
578
Last, and going beyond electoral strategy, when online platforms play a larger role in parties' inter-579 actions with members, but are also susceptible to cyberattacks, how are parties keeping them secure? and most importantly, we would like to thank the reviewers and the editor for their valuable and detailed 589 observations, which actively contributed in refocusing this paper's initial theoretical framework. 
